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New Developments in Private Political
Risk Insurance and Trade Finance
When Linn Williams asked if I could participate on this program, I was
pleased to say yes. Only later did I discover that Linn had billed my
address as New Developments in Private Sector Political Risk Insurance.
The major development apparent in today's environment is actually a
continuing contraction in the flow of trade and investment to developing
countries and, therefore, a reduction in our business. But it is obvious
that, as businessmen, we must respond to this trend by finding new ap-
plications for our insurance capabilities and ways to support the trade
that is taking place, which is the subject I will try to emphasize in my
talk.
I will try to strike a balance in my remarks between discussion of the
political risk insurance coverages and more issue-oriented concepts. This
should enable me to use this presentation to address the issues that impact
most directly the value-added advice you may be called upon to provide
to your clients.
I have organized my comments around three major headings:
(1) Background on the structure and operation of the private sector
political risk and export credit market;
(2) A review of the coverages available from the private market, with
particular emphasis on the more nontraditional and innovative ap-
plications of the insurance capabilities; and
(3) Some considerations to keep in mind if you become involved in the
use of these insurance products.
Now let's consider some of the issues that will have a significant impact
on the future development of the private sector market.
*Vice President of the American International Group and Vice Chairman of AIG Political
Risk.
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I. Background
I believe it is quite important to understand the origins and evolution
of the private sector market, as well as its current structure, in order to
appreciate how this market functions. Much of the tradition built up over
the years still influences strongly the types of coverages available in the
private market and the terms and conditions of the policies that are written.
Political risk insurance emerged from the marine insurance coverages
provided to exporters and shipping lines and, to that extent, has been
around for an extended period of time. As might be expected, Lloyds
was then, and remains today, a major factor in the political risk market.
The development of a more broadly based private market probably dates
back ten to fifteen years with the entrance of other leading players, such
as American International Group. The number of companies who partic-
ipate in this business is not great, however, with even fewer insurers
exercising any leadership role.
The coverage initially offered by the market was protection against
confiscation, expropriation, or nationalization of assets or fixed invest-
ments. Over time, other coverages became available, notably protection
against loss arising from government actions that interfere in the delivery
of goods or performance of other contract obligations. This "contract
frustration" insurance covered a multitude of events, such as trade em-
bargoes, license cancellation, premature cancellation of contracts, or
nonpayment by a government organization for goods or services. This
category of contract frustration or repudiation coverage, particularly re-
lating to the guarantee of payment obligations, is the category that has
grown most rapidly and has brought the political risk into the mainstream
of trade and trade finance. Other coverages, such as pure currency in-
convertibility and wrongful calling of bid or guarantee bonds, are also
offered by the market, but are much smaller. The concept underlying all
these products is that they provide protection to the insured against for-
tuitous, unforeseen events arising out of government action, perhaps itself
an arguable thesis in today's environment of debt reschedulings and bal-
ance of payments problems.
The private sector also provides a market for export credit insurance,
although its capacity is smaller and of more recent vintage. This insurance
protects against a private buyer's failure to pay for goods or services,
whether occasioned by commercial default or bankruptcy, or by failure
of the local exchange authority to make available adequate foreign cur-
rency. Although the two programs overlap in the coverage of transfer
risk, they are perceived by the market as quite separate for several rea-
sons. Chief among them is the fact that Lloyds underwriting syndicates,
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by virtue of internal regulation and agreement, are prohibited from in-
suring against commercial default or financial guarantee type exposures.
Again, coverage provided under export credit programs brings the insur-
ance industry in as a direct participant in the trade finance arena.
As part of this background discussion, I also wanted to provide a brief
description of the functioning of the insurance and reinsurance market.
For this, it is best to talk separately of the Lloyds market and the non-
Lloyds, or company, market. Lloyds is composed of hundreds of under-
writing syndicates under separate management, some of whom choose to
participate in various types of political risk insurance. Requests for in-
surance are handled on a one-by-one basis by brokers who first gain
support and negotiate terms and conditions with syndicates specializing
in political risk insurance, and then, on the strength of the "leaders"
participation, attract other syndicates to sign on for a percentage of the
risk exposure. To increase the efficiency of this process, some standing
commitments, known as "line slips," exist, where a number of syndicates
automatically agree to participate on risk provided a specific group of
leaders have committed to the transaction.
The company market functions on the basis of reinsurance treaties that
commit participating reinsurers to a specific percentage of each and every
transaction underwritten by the primary or "lead" underwriter. There are
only a few political risk treaties of any significance in existence today,
the largest of which is managed by AIG Political Risk. Because such a
treaty is a standing obligation to accept liability without direct involvement
in individual decisions, the treaty, both in writing and through industry
practice, spells out the limits and parameters of the coverages that can
be underwritten. Interestingly, Lloyds syndicates participate as reinsur-
ers, along with the direct business, on almost all political risk treaties.
These treaties are annually renewable by participating reinsurers, al-
though reinsurers remain on risk until expiration for all policies written
during that treaty year.
There are two points to be made. First, for a high hazard business such
as political risk that requires broad reinsurance participation, overall par-
ticipation is rather thin. Second, the annual nature of treaty negotiations
and individual risk decision-making that characterizes Lloyds makes this
market quite fragile. Capacity, in the form of capital, can quickly shift
away from this business if the actual results or prospects fall below ex-
pectations. To sustain our momentum in this business, and prevent a shift
away from the more innovative application of these coverages, we must
approach the subject of trade finance with a great deal of caution.
One last background comment is the positioning of the private market
vis-i-vis the wide variety of national schemes such as OPIC, FCIA, EGGD,
COFACE, etc. We would regard our coverages as both competitive with,
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and complementary to, those programs. The private sector obviously
lacks the resources to provide the long-term commitments of the national
programs and is constrained also by the need to be profitable, an objective
well beyond the reach of the national schemes today. But we can act with
more independence from government policy decisions, and we hope with
more flexibility and responsiveness as a result. Our goal, over time, is to
find ways to generate more cooperation with the public sector to the
benefit of all concerned.
II. New Political Risk Insurance Coverages
Let me recap the forms of political risk insurance coverage available
today from the private market. Broadly, these coverages included pro-
tection against confiscation, expropriation, or nationalization; license can-
cellation, nondelivery, embargo, or other events of contract repudiation
or frustration; currency inconvertibility; wrongful calling of guarantees;
and, comprehensive export credit insurance. Singly or in combination
these coverages traditionally have been used to protect investors, con-
tractors, exporters, and financial institutions against political and/or credit
risks. As will become clear, these coverages are generic and can be applied
in a variety of ways.
It is also worth noting, more specifically, the parameters of insurable
transactions and the capacity available in the market today. The maximum
policy term for political risk transactions is three years, and for export
credit the maximum term is five years. The shorter term for political risk
is partly due to underwriting considerations, but also matches the three-
year accounting cycle used by Lloyds, the major writers and reinsurers
of this business, in managing their syndicate books. Individual policies
can, however, often be rolled forward annually to maintain continuous
cover On long-term investments.
Market capacity varies by type of transaction and over time. For ex-
ample, AIG Political Risk in 1986 has the capacity within its reinsurance
treaties to insure individual political risk transactions with exposure ex-
ceeding forty-five million dollars. Additional capacity can often be ob-
tained from other underwriters to increase this limit further, perhaps three
to four times this limit for simple expropriation risks and one and one-
half to two times this amount for other types of coverages. For export
credit, the policy limit per buyer available in the market today is generally
less than ten million dollars. In part due to issues unrelated to political
risk, aggregate capacity available in the market has declined since its peak
in 1983, when AIG Political Risk alone controlled single risk capacity of
approximately seventy million dollars per transaction.
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I have identified four areas where we see a potential or emerging
demand for political risk insurance applied in a nontraditional way.
Not all of these developments will be equally successful, but each
is worth mentioning.
1. "Securitization" of trade finance receivables for sale to large insti-
tutional investors. As early as 1983 AIG Political Risk began to experiment
with the packaging and securitization of trade finance obligations, an
activity that paralleled the efforts to securitize other financial assets, such
as mortgages, car loan receivables, etc. Our initial activity was known in
the market as the TRAFCO program, which was the name of the firm
that provided the packaging and servicing of the trade finance securities.
This program also involved Salomon Brothers as the placement agent.
From 1983 through 1986 this program generated approximately five hundred
million dollars in trade finance securities placed with institutional investors.
The program was marketed to exporters as an incremental source of
trade finance available on either a fixed or floating rate basis. The under-
lying export transaction was insured by AIG Political Risk and purchased
by TRAFCO. Because the political risk or export credit policy issued
contains certain exclusions, waiting periods, performance warranties, and
coinsurance features, this purchase was with specific recourse to the
exporter. These trade receivables were packaged by TRAFCO into se-
curities in amounts from fifteen to seventy million dollars. In order to
obtain an AAA rating for these securities, an AIG insurance subsidiary,
National Union, would issue a second "pool" policy that was a full faith
and credit guarantee of principal and interest, taking the underlying po-
litical risk policy and recourse to the exporter as security.
At the moment we are not pursuing this type of business, although
TRAFCO itself is still active. The program as originally structured had
some flaws, partly impacting its competitiveness against its financing
sources, which we believe can and will be worked out. The concept of
providing a conduit financing vehicle for insured trade obligations is ba-
sically sound and can provide a convenient program for exporters. In
fact, we believe the concept can extend easily beyond pure trade finance
to other structured financing transactions where political risk insurance
can provide an element of security that will assist in either making such
transactions feasible or lowering the net cost of funding.
One possible constraint on the emergence of this type of business is
the increasing regulation of the financial guarantee insurance business.
Any significant capital standards may impact these financing programs,
as well as the availability of the underlying insurance itself.
2. Insurance of countertrade, barter or other non-cash-based trade
transaction. As balance of payment conditions in the developing countries
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have deteriorated, the volume of trade with these countries has declined
and/or is increasingly done on cash terms. A second trend we see is the
return to the traditional mechanism of self-liquidating trade transactions.
The whole concept of countertrade, a part of this trend, is in fact not
new, but is a return to these traditional trading approaches.
The private political risk insurance industry is particularly well posi-
tioned to facilitate this type of trade and trade finance and has already
been quite active. The entire basis of political risk insurance is to provide
protection against governmental actions that interfere with the fulfillment
of a contractual obligation or the failure of a government or pari-statal
organization to perform under contract. Whereas almost all commercial
banks have problems dealing with nonmonetary transactions, the political
risk insurers would actually prefer transactions that involve performance
risks to those involving payment risks. We have been involved extensively
with these types of transactions for the past several years, and see the
demand growing very rapidly in the future. Three basic types of trans-
actions are in the market today:
* pre-export finance or the advance purchase of commodities or goods;
* delivery of goods in payment for capital equipment, raw materials, or
other factor inputs;
* countertrade arrangements used to retire existing debt, often at a
discount.
We can guarantee that the host government does not interfere with or
prevent the delivery of the product or renege on the agreement to allow
an offset against the export proceeds. To the extent a private supplier is
involved, we can also use the export credit treaty to provide protection
against its default. With our assumption of the performance risk, these
transactions can become "bankable" and, in fact, we have used the
TRAFCO program for several pre-export finance transactions.
3. Insurance of debt/equity swaps, equity funds or other efforts at LDC
privatization. This third area is one where there is a lot of interest and
potential, but little actual activity to date. Most of these schemes would
involve the guarantee of normal investor/ownership rights, currency in-
convertibility or other specific rights contractually committed to the inves-
tors. Since the concept of privatization is rather new, no real track record
has been established vis-5-vis the commitments given by the host gov-
ernments. Most investors are, therefore, naturally reluctant to proceed
in the absence of some form of third party guarantee. The private sector
political risk industry is eager to have the opportunity to develop programs
to meet the needs of investors and host governments. While there are
likely to be issues to overcome, we are confident that the private industry
can meet this need and provide capacity of one hundred million dollars
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or more per country. I would encourage those of you involved in this
process to sit down with us to discuss situations that may come up.
I might also mention another related area, which is the proposed cre-
ation of "trade credit certificates" that could be used to balance the
foreign exchange made available to pay for imports with foreign exchange
generated by exports for an individual country. Such a clearing system
would issue these certificates to exporters and provide the right to receive
foreign exchange to pay for a similar quantity of imports. These certifi-
cates could be bartered, sold, or traded on a secondary market. If this
mechanism develops, the private market also would be willing to guar-
antee country performance in honoring these trade credit certificates.
4. Development of export credit guarantee and financing programs for
newly developing countries. One of the chief advantages the private mar-
ket enjoys vis-A-vis the national export credit schemes is that we are not
concerned with country of origin of goods or services. As a result, the
private market has traditionally filled the regulatory or policy gap created
by such national constraints. This provides an opportunity for the private
market to work together with companies or financial institutions in coun-
tries such as Brazil, Korea, or Hungary to provide political risk or export
credit insurance for their exports. We are already beginning to see this
opportunity emerge. This activity is taking two forms.
First, we see a substantial increase in the demand for our political risk
and export credit facilities from large exporters and contractors from these
countries. This is particularly necessary as these countries encounter
resistance to further export penetration of the OECD markets and are
forced to consider development of new LDC markets for future growth.
The second possibility, and one we are actively cultivating, is the use
of our insurance facilities as a mini "official" export guarantee insurance
program. To compete effectively for export markets it will be necessary
for developing countries to provide their exporters with appropriate risk
management techniques and access to adequate liquidity for supplier cred-
its. Our insurance facilities can deliver these risk management skills and,
by utilizing the financing programs described earlier, can also provide
access to sources of hard currency financing. Obviously, such programs
would need to be done on a profitable basis, and so would not be exactly
the same as national schemes of the OECD countries.
I have tried to give a brief profile of the activity developing in four
relatively new areas of political risk insurance that we are excited about.
We are looking at, or hope to introduce in the future, a range of other
innovative applications of insurance capabilities to trade and investment
flows. Some of these include a comprehensive leasing product that would
combine expropriation, lease payment, and residual value coverages; cov-
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erage against consequential loss due to business interruption arising from
governmental actions; a package of political risk and terrorism/civil in-
surrection coverages, the latter of which is also presently offered by AIG;
and, tender exchange rate insurance for tender bids in foreign currencies.
As I mentioned earlier, we also hope to find ways to work with national
schemes in the U.S. and Europe to provide an even more comprehensive
package of coverages and increased capacity to our insureds.
II. Considerations in Using These Facilities
One of the primary considerations in the placement of any insurance
coverage is the quality of, and security offered by, the insurer with whom
you are dealing. Selection of an insurer, as well as negotiation of policy
terms and conditions and price, are the primary services of insurance
brokers, who are equally active in political risk insurance. The key dis-
tinction with regard to this type of insurance is that there are really only
two markets that offer significant capacity: AIG Political Risk and Lloyds.
Also, since Lloyds syndicates are active reinsurers of everyone writing
this business, the policy coverages and limitations are somewhat stan-
dardized, although what each company is prepared to write and how can
vary significantly.
I would suggest that it is good practice to work with a knowledgeable
broker or contact us directly for advice early in this process of structuring
any transaction. Often we can help identify the insurable risks and, with
you, structure the deal in such a way that it can be insured. Other than
this, I would offer the following caveats regarding these insurance
coverages:
I. Political risk and export credit insurance are not "blanket" guar-
antees but are insurance contracts that provide indemnification for loss
arising from specific events and under well-defined circumstances. There
are a number of exclusions, performance warranties, waiting periods, and
coinsurance features built into all the policies. Both you and your clients
should understand fully the terms of the policy and not simply assume
that the insurance will respond to all possible events of loss.
2. These insurances should not be viewed as protection of cash flow,
but rather protection against loss of the net asset value of receivables,
working assets, or other investments. These policies generally carry sig-
nificant waiting periods, from 180 to 720 days, and we do not indemnify
for interest during the waiting period. This issue can often be a source of
great misunderstanding with insureds who may be using this insurance
for the first time.
3. The use of political risk insurance for transactions where the sole or
primary exposure is a "banking" risk-i.e., payment risk-is probably
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neither appropriate nor cost effective. Our insurance contract, since it is
not an on-demand, full faith and credit policy, is inherently inferior to a
letter of credit or other negotiable banking instrument. As such, we are
always skeptical of transactions that come to us where the risk could be
assumed by a bank, since it probably means something is wrong with the
deal. Our underwriting will reflect this skepticism and, if we are prepared
to commit our capacity, we will expect a healthy premium rate.
4. Our underwriting process relies heavily on the representations and
warranties contained in the policy, particularly as they relate to knowledge
the insured might have about circumstances that could give rise to loss
under the policy. Since we are by definition adversely selected against in
the transactions we see, we regard this business as one that must be
conducted on the basis of utmost good faith. In this regard, you should
advise your clients to be completely open and honest in the representa-
tions they make to the insurers, since it is not our practice to undertake
substantial independent investigation of the information they provide to
us. This can be a major problem in the event that a claim arises and we
find that the insured has not been totally forthright.
5. In the event that a default or loss occurs in connection with an insured
transaction, it is the desire of the insurers not to become immediately
involved. The purpose of the waiting period is to provide time for the
situation to cure and to avoid disruption in the normal commercial rela-
tionships between exporter and buyer by virtue of our own efforts to
recover. Because we rely on the insured in this regard, we expect him to
behave as if the transaction were uninsured and to take all actions nec-
essary to resolve the problem. If this minimization of loss is not done by
the insured, it will impact coverage.
These were just a few brief thoughts on things to keep in mind when
considering the use of political risk insurance. Again, I believe the key
is to make certain that it is the right product for the specific transaction
and to have realistic expectations regarding what the insurance coverage
actually guarantees.
IV. Conclusion
If I may, at this point, I would like to return to what I referred to at
the beginning of my talk as major issues faced by the private political risk
insurance industry. The industry is at something of a crossroads in its
development. I believe it is particularly appropriate to speak to groups
such as this about the issues that bring us to this juncture, since many of
you will have an influence on how this matter is eventually resolved.
The primary issue I am referring to is the wholesale rescheduling of
debt by third world countries. As I mentioned, our contract frustration
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policies have been used increasingly as a guarantee against nonpayment
by governments. As a result, the industry has been pulled into resched-
ulings of trade debt undertaken by some countries and, of even more
concern, London Club reschedulings where we have worked together with
commercial banks or other financial institutions.
We see reschedulings as a creation of the commercial banks and mul-
tilateral agencies. While not ideal, this mechanism at least partly meets
the needs of the banks by preserving the assets on their balance sheet
and ensuring that interest is paid with some regularity. Unfortunately, this
mechanism has the opposite impact on the insurance industry.
When a rescheduling takes place, we are obligated to indemnify our
insured once the waiting period has expired. This paid claim comes di-
rectly from our surplus, or equity capital. Accounting practices in the
insurance industry absolutely prohibit carrying on the balance sheet pro-
spective salvage associated with a paid claim, so newly issued promissory
notes do us no good. Even if we are successful in avoiding the paid claim,
it is still necessary that we establish a loss reserve against this potential
obligation, which would further reduce our surplus and negatively impact
our capacity to write business.
A second and equally fundamental problem is the structure of our rein-
surance treaties. Our treaties are annual contracts that must be renego-
tiated every year. In order to attract participation of reinsurers, we must
demonstrate that the business produced has been profitable. This is one
of the chief reasons that we limit the tenure of our policies to three years.
When we have paid claims, or reserved against loss, and these obligations
are rescheduled over five- to ten-year time frames, it is impossible for us
to render meaningful accounts. Also, since our treaties are annual con-
tracts, and we may have substantially different reinsurers or percentage
shares year to year, we cannot roll forward our portfolio year to year or
write new guarantees tied to old problems.
Even if it were possible from a regulatory and accounting perspective
to handle the rescheduled obligations, the insurance industry has learned
a lesson from the banks and cannot and will not mortgage capital by
continuous rescheduling. We are not funding institutions and cannot be
expected to operate as banks. As a result of this problem we have already
lost a lot of the support and capacity for this business and have retrenched
significantly in the type of business we do. We believe we provide an
extremely valuable service in facilitating trade and investment, and would
like to have the opportunity to pursue some of the new ideas I have written
about, but can only do so if some satisfactory solution to this problem is
found.
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